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ABSTRACT. This paper examines recent manifestations of the emergence of national
identity amongst the citizens of Malta, now the smallest member state of the European
Union. In this search, discrete events and ‘things’ are examined as symbolic para-
phernalia, empirical phenomena that provide insights to overarching narratives about
identity, nationalism and integration. The discussion and eventual decision on the
choice of euro coin faces in Malta is proposed as one that illustrates a process of
‘nascent nationalism’. Meanwhile, the arrival of boatloads of undocumented migrants
on Malta’s shores has also encouraged the evolution of a secular, national character in
Malta. Such episodes, and others, ultimately reﬂect a need for symbols of national
unity that remain largely absent in this ‘nationless state’ which continues to be gripped
by a bipolar partisanship that spares almost no one.
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Scene-setting: there are two sides to the coin
The choice of stylised bridges to grace the reverse side of the euro notes, now
the currency of 400 million Europeans, should not surprise us. The European
Union (EU) is a grand project which speaks ambitiously to both integration
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and insulation. While there are strong movements in favour of a deepening
and widening of European-wide initiatives, as is the very notion of a single
European currency, at the same time the EU remains essentially a platform
for the advancement or protection of stubbornly state-based interests. The
bridges epitomise the concept of the single market, of ‘building Europe’
(Sidaway 2001: 743); yet they remind us of the separate units (‘nation-states’?)
that make the bridge and its bridging functions necessary. Meanwhile, though
the euro notes are the same everywhere, the euro coins portray, on one side,
national monuments and symbols from each member state; with a common
rendition of the map of Europe on the other side (van Houtum and Stru¨ver
2002: 145). The coins therefore better capture the integrationist and localist
thrusts of the European projects, each of these represented on either of the
coins’ two sides.
The choice of what to reproduce on the obverse of the euro coins has
proved to be an interesting matter for debate.1 The exercise has obliged euro
zone countries to determine appropriate symbols of national stature, which
both identify with the presumed identity of the state, as well as differentiate
that state from any other. ‘The images on bills and coins are usually chosen
carefully in order to connect with historical and sometimes nationalist
symbols of the various nation-states’ (Risse 2003: 488). In any case, the
eventual choice of the national icons minted on the coins can serve as a
reﬂexive exercise on the contemporary perceptions of nationhood and
national identity, as well as its ‘branding’ in a regional context.
The task at hand
In semi-autobiographic style, this paper examines manifestations of the
emergence of national identity amongst the Maltese, now the citizens of the
smallest member state of the EU in both land area and population. In this
search, the choice of euro coin images by the Maltese, and the boatloads of
undocumented migrants arriving on Malta’s shores from Africa, are just two
of a series of episodes that are insightful illustrations of a process that can be
seen as indicative of a ‘nascent nationalism’. This is so because Malta may
have been a politically distinct state for centuries, but it is one whose people
ﬁnd enormous difﬁculties in projecting or imagining themselves as a nation,
except in a vague and distant cultural sense. Maltese sociologist Abela (2006:
19) refers to this condition ambiguously as a ‘two-nation party-political divide
within one social nation’.
I suggest that the discussion and eventual decision on the choice of the euro
coin faces in Malta is one that ultimately reﬂects a search for still absent
symbols of national unity. The coming to terms with the alterity of dark-
skinned, non-Christian undocumented migrants from Africa, and the position
that Brussels, seat of the EU bureaucracy, is seen to be taking on this
‘invasion’, are similarly symptomatic of this quest for identity. This search
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remains stiﬂed by a bi-communal partisanship that sees each of the two main
political parties take on the characteristics of an ethnie,2 a moral community,
extending the locus of empathy, trust and identiﬁcation with others as if in an
extended family (Baldacchino 2002a: 198; Srebrnik 2000: 57). An insightful,
non-Maltese researcher commented:
Partisanship in this polarized polity is so pervasive, ingrained and linked to class
ideology and locality that preference patterns are known by street. Loyalties are
strong, stable and rooted in social and family background(Hirczy 1995: 258).
The paper will examine discrete events and ‘things’ as symbolic paraphernalia
that are illustrative, as well as symptomatic, of the current ﬂedgling character
of Maltese nationalism. A series of empirical phenomena are thus presented
with a view to providing insights into overarching narratives about identity,
nationalism and integration. The style is largely inductive, seeking to theorise
‘from the bottom up’ on the basis of reﬂections on speciﬁc recent historical
events.
In this paper, the product of national identity is taken to imply a ‘we’, a
people with common historical characteristics (which include shared mem-
ories of the past and visions of the future) that are largely symbolic but
sustained and refreshed by daily practices and routines (as suggested by Billig
1995; see also Jacobs and Maier 1997: 17). While elites may and do construct
national identities, and different elites may craft divergent identities meant for
the same citizens, theorists such as Anthony D. Smith contend that such
disagreements would still ride over a solid core of unifying elements,
providing ‘. . . a sense of continuity, shared memory and collective destiny’
(Smith 1991: 29; 2004: 197).
This paper argues that, while the Maltese share a common language and
have no readily perceptible racial, ethnic or rural/urban cleavages, the
partisan political mobilisation of both state and civil society effectively erodes
‘unifying elements’ or transforms them (at least perceptively) to partisan
appropriation and symbolic use. Moreover, there is no strong sense of cultural
and linguistic discontinuity with outsider-nations (following Hannerz 1996:
21). Thus, Malta is presented as a polarised, deeply divided, ‘nationless state’.
Upside-down decolonisation
One of the difﬁculties facing the Maltese in sharing a self-image of themselves
is that, while they have borne many centuries of colonialism, they have not
been champions of anti-colonialism. Rather, the opposite has been the case.
Only in the case of the brief French Occupation (1798–1800) did the Maltese
rise up as a people against their oppressors, and then only because the French
had foolishly decided to start ransacking the Catholic churches which the
Maltese still hold dear. Over the long British period of colonial administration
(1800–1964), the Maltese adapted to a cycle of boom and bust that depended
signiﬁcantly on military expenditure: ironically, peace time brought poverty
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and unemployment; whereas the threat of, or actual, war brought work and
muniﬁcence (Baldacchino 1988; Busuttil 1965; Zammit 1984). Malta became a
specialised fortress economy, playing such a key role in the Mediterranean
theatre during the Second World War that the country was given the George
Cross, now displayed on its ﬂag. Yet, after the 1956 Suez debacle, when
Britain decided to trim its strategic outposts in line with its much-reduced
global stature, Malta suddenly became dispensable, its strategic value re-
dundant. The Maltese Government resigned in 1958, police stations were
burnt, the constitution was revoked . . . essentially because the Maltese did not
want the British (with their war machine expenditures) to pull out. Eventually,
independence was secured in 1964 and an agreement was signed in 1972 to
extend the rundown of the British bases (plus the payment of rent) in Malta to
1979. The Maltese, unlike many other colonies, never fought any wars of
independence to get rid of the colonial yoke; instead, they resorted to some
quite ingenious international political lobbying to oblige the colonial power to
stay longer . . . and in the meantime inject more precious cash into the local
economy (see e.g. Micallef 1979).
This is not a unique example of ‘upside-down decolonisation’, where the
colonial ruler is the one keen to ditch the colony and force it into
independence, while the colonised are generally keen to extend the colonial
relationship (e.g. Hoefte and Oostindie 1989; Payne 1991). In fact, many
island jurisdictions around the world have perfected this attitude so well that
they have consistently refused to accept full independence. Referenda in the
Dutch Antilles (1993, 1994, 2005, 2006), Puerto Rico (1993), US Virgin
Islands (1993), and Bermuda (1993) have all rejected independence by huge
margins (Baldacchino 2004).
Political afﬁliation grants substantial economic advantages to small, non–
sovereign, island units. These beneﬁts include: free trade with, and export
preference from, the parent country; social welfare assistance; ready access to
external capital through special tax concessions; availability of external
labour markets through migration; aid–ﬁnanced infrastructure and commu-
nications; higher quality health and educational systems; natural disaster
relief; and provision of external defence costs (McElroy and Mahoney 1999).
What these arrangements tend to do, however, is to render the small island
economy over-dependent on metropolitan ﬁscal transfers. Local politics
becomes gripped by what kind of integration to seek with the metropolitan
power. Integration is not an issue: only its details are subject to debate and
negotiation.3
Malta may have secured political independence, contrary to sub-national
island jurisdictions. But the evolution of its national identity has not kept pace
with its emergence as a sovereign state. Interestingly, Malta’s current political
landscape was forged in the late 1880s when colonial Britain proposed to
introduce English as the language of instruction in schools. The conservative
elite in the country, led by lawyers, clerics and the learned intelligentsia, then
spoke, studied and wrote in Italian: they understood that they could maintain
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social control if Italian remained the principal language of instruction and
thus eventually of the church, state and legislature (Frendo 1979: 208).
Meanwhile, the upcoming middle class realised that the English language
presented a window of opportunity to break or somehow circumvent the
monopoly power of the Italo-philes. Thus coalesced what would emerge as
Malta’s two main political parties: the Partito Anti-Riformista, blocking
reform (with its name appropriately in Italian); and the Reform Party, in
favour of reform (with its name in English) (Hull 1993). The distinct Maltese
language – the only Semitic language to be written in a Latin script – did not
even feature in this debate: an alphabet for Maltese was only proposed in the
late 1700s and standardised in 1924. The National Council for the Maltese
Language was only established by law in 2004.4
Integration options
The epitome of these integrationist agendas was reached in the twentieth
century when, faced with the challenges of development, the leaders of the two
political camps explored the possibilities of integration with their respective
motherlands: Italy and Britain.5
The Italian project was doomed to failure when planes started dropping
bombs on the Maltese the day after Italy entered the war as Germany’s ally in
June 1940 (Mitchell 2003: 382). The leaders of the Nationalist Party (NP) (as
the Partito Anti-Riformista was subsequently rechristened) were exiled to
Uganda for the duration of the war because they were deemed too dangerous
to stay on the island, given their fascist, pro-Italian sympathies.
The British project was later in coming but much more elaborate. A
referendum was actually organised by the Malta Labour Party (MLP) in
government in 1956 (as the Reform Party was then called) to explore the
readiness of the Maltese to seek full integration with Britain. Although a slim
majority did vote in favour, the low turnout (which was instigated by the local
Roman Catholic Church, unsure of its status within a Protestant Britain:
more on this below) was used by the British authorities as the excuse to
disregard the result. It was only after the realisation that Britain was not
seriously entertaining the integration option that Malta’s two political parties
switched their sights to political independence. Thus, the pursuit of full
sovereignty was only a strategy of ‘second best’.
It appears from their history that the Maltese have approached the whole
business of independence and integration in a most pragmatic manner. The
very open nature of the small local economy makes an export orientation
essential; a large Maltese diaspora now resides in Australia, Canada, the USA
and Britain and is responsible for much tourist trafﬁc to/from the islands;
even when the avowedly socialist Malta Labour Party was in power, the
country’s economic policy never faltered in seeking to attract foreign direct
investment (Vella 1994). English is today an ofﬁcial language, along with
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Maltese. These circumstances have made for a very ﬂuid jurisdiction, with on
the one hand an international orientation that runs on written English, and
makes the islands very attractive to tourists and expatriate retirees; while on
the other hand having a domestic space that is driven by the Maltese language
and word-of-mouth communication (e.g. Chircop 1994).
The Maltese language is the centre-piece of a rich and ancient culture that
has found its major expression via the patronage of the local Catholic Church,
especially since the early nineteenth century. The inﬂuence of the Catholic
Church remains very strong in contemporary Malta: almost one-third of all
students in primary and secondary education attend church schools; over half
the population attends mass on Sunday; Malta is the only European country
which does not legally sanction either divorce or abortion; and the conversion
of the Maltese to Christianity by St Paul has been central to the national
narrative (Mitchell 2002). The parish has also been the main expression of
local governance in Malta; even with the introduction of local councils in the
1990s, the latter have quickly been taken over by the established political
parties; to the extent that the parish remains the only safe space for non-
partisan local activity and organisation. With an estimated ninety-eight per
cent of the local population professing to be Roman Catholic (e.g. Grixti
2006: 109), it is easy to see how, when everything else fails, the Roman
Catholic Church takes on symbolic powers of national representation.6
Partisan politics rule OK
This rich cultural heritage has, however, not lent itself to the construction of
nationhood as such. With the Catholic Church aligning itself against the
referendum campaign of the Malta Labour Party in the mid-1950s, and with
the understanding that the MLP leadership was harbouring communist
sympathies, the Church excommunicated the MLP party leaders and its
diehard sympathisers, refusing them holy sacraments or burial in sacred
ground; and denouncing a vote for Labour as a ‘mortal sin’: a shocking turn
of events in the twentieth century which destroyed the broad legitimacy that
the religious institution until then had enjoyed amongst the populace-at-large.
The current conﬁguration of the partisan divide has thus solidiﬁed: only the
NP and MLP have been represented in Parliament since 1971; only a few
thousand votes continue to separate them; and, given these circumstances, it
should be no surprise that party discipline in the House is extreme. Strong,
ascribed and inter-generational party loyalties fuel, and are in turn fuelled by,
two parallel, political party juggernauts – which include party owned or
driven neighbourhood committees, newspapers, radio and television stations
– that attempt to lock, reinforce and secure voter loyalties from cradle to
grave. A diffuse system of grass-roots organisation ensures that practically all
voters are known for their political sympathies. Patronage, favouritism and
clientelism are widely but discretely practised; and few would dare being seen
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as not voting, come election day: which explains why Malta has the highest
electoral turnout in the world for democratic elections: no less than ninety-
seven per cent (Hirczy 1995; Franklin 2004: 94–5).
The country is a stably pillarised society (following Lijphart 1968), split
down the middle in terms of partisan support: a distinguishing feature in other
societies.7 Unfolding as it does on a very small island jurisdiction where
anonymity is hardly possible, the pressure to afﬁliate with one of two camps is
intense; the only way to avoid this is ‘ex-isle’ (Edmond and Smith 2003);
while, for those who stay, those who are not with us are obviously against us.
Civil society is underdeveloped and, as far as it does exist, it is dangerously
over-politicised. Since 1991, Malta has been the only European democracy to
allow political parties to privately own radio and television stations (Sammut
2007). The divide extends dangerously to the interpretation of recent Maltese
history. Thus, for example, the MLP does not consider Independence Day (21
September) to be the key deﬁning event of Malta’s political development,
citing instead Freedom Day (31 March), the day commemorating when the
last British troops left the island in 1979, as the really key episode. In its bid to
establish a widely acceptable, single National Day in 1988, the Government
ended up recognising the dilemma and opted for no less than ﬁve national
days, the only country in the world to do so: a reﬂection of the absence of
consensus on what is salient in recent Maltese history.8 Serracino-Inglott
(1988: 370) has argued that, if one were to understand ‘nation’ as a discrete
socio-cultural unit with collective aims, it is tempting to argue that Malta
(especially in the 1970s and 1980s) consisted not of one nation, but of two,
organised along political party lines. I would argue that this assessment
remains valid.
Within this division, which came close to civil war in 1982–4, neither the
Church nor any other local institution has been able to play a satisfactory
bridging role. As a result, a nascent nationalism may be ﬁnding a frenzied but
short-lived expression when an international event which is not associated
with the local state (and therefore safely removed from domestic politics)
kindles a therapeutic (but transient) burst of national pride and its identiﬁable
heroes. Clear examples include the events following the securing of a runner-
up position for local singer Ira Losco in the 47th Eurovision Song Contest in
May 2002 (see Figures 1 and 2);9 and Malta beating Hungary 2–1 in a Euro
2008 Soccer Qualifying home match in October 2006. But then, on the other
hand, even these manifestations could be just outbursts of patriotism.10
The above ideas were articulated in a paper published in an international
journal (Baldacchino 2002a), then serialised over two parts in the Sunday
Times of Malta, a local, high-circulation, weekly, English-language news-
paper. The response was, expectedly, largely vicious. I have been accused of
being unpatriotic, and of misreading Malta’s history and character; but also
commended for having dared utter the unutterable. I also participated in a
live TV discussion in January 2003 with an eminent history professor who is a
champion of Malta’s alleged nationhood.11 During that programme, I asked
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viewers whether they could identify any contemporary Maltese ‘of stature’
who would not be easily associated with one of the two main political parties.
The question was meant to be rhetorical. The answer is: no. As I reported in
my 2002 paper, a German entrepreneur living in Malta has insightfully
observed that the Maltese are very proud of their (past) history, but not of
their present. As long as events are telescoped back into the past, a past when
political disagreement is not seen as having been institutionalised in terms of
political parties and therefore candidly assumed to have been overtaken by
‘national interests’, then most Maltese can agree as to the interpretation and
relevance of events. Come closer to the present and that agreement evaporates
into thin air. As Mitchell insightfully observes in his aptly titled book
Ambivalent Europeans, the Maltese have an ‘awkward relationship with their
history and identity’ (Mitchell 2002: 31).
Which icons for the coins?12
The choice of the designs to grace Malta’s euro coins illustrates this dilemma
(see Figure 3). First, four themes had been chosen, ‘each one capturing a
speciﬁc aspect of the Maltese national fabric’, with three different options
presented for each theme. Yet, none of these twelve options included an actual
Maltese person, or a contemporary Maltese trait – except the ofﬁcial coat of
arms of the state (which, by the way, has been changed twice since
independence), and which was ultimately one of three images selected. (The
monument commemorating the Great Siege of 1565 was included under the
Modern Malta theme!) The allegoric ﬁgure of Malta was one of the options on
offer. Eight of the options represent images of structures from Malta’s history
Figures 1 and 2. Displays of spontaneous nationalism: Maltese singer Ira Losco (left)
being mobbed at Malta International Airport (right) after returning from the
Eurovision Song Contest in Estonia. Photo on left: r 2002 MaltaMedia
Productions. Photo on right by Darren Zammit Lupi, published in The Times,
Malta, 28 May 2002. r Allied Newspapers Limited.
r The author 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009
Nationalism in Malta 155
or prehistory, ranging from megalithic temples to the Valletta fortiﬁcations.
Eventually, the most popular choice of image turned out to be the Italian
sculptor Giuseppe Mazzuoli’s Baptism of Christ in St John’s Co-Cathedral, in
Malta’s capital city. This choice was the subject of a frenzied local campaign
to have a religious theme imposed on the coins and thus perhaps exact sweet
and symbolic revenge for the EU’s refusal to acknowledge its Christian
traditions in its draft Constitution. But, as things turned out, it was the
Maltese authorities themselves that withdrew this controversial image from
the running, precisely because of its distinct religious connotations (Grima
2006a). Meanwhile, the so-called ‘Maltese Cross’: now a national symbol of
Malta, but actually the symbol of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta –
which was not one of the initial options ﬂagged for consideration – was also
selected as an image for the coins. Ironically, the absence of the ‘Maltese
Cross’ from the initial set of options was explained as due to it being ‘. . . non-
Maltese or normally associated with the Order of St John’, which is a religious
organisation (Grima 2006b). (This objection has apparently been subse-
quently, and quietly, overruled.) The third image to make it was that of the
fac¸ade of the Mnajdra megalithic temples, a World Heritage Site. Catholicism
remains the closest reference point to Maltese nationalism, while the country
blandly appropriates alien symbols (including crosses, sculptures and the
artefacts of long-eclipsed civilisations) as its own.
Figure 3. The coin faces which made it, and the one which did not: Mnajdra
Prehistoric Temple, the Coat of Arms of the Republic of Malta and the ‘Maltese
Cross’ represent the selected three coin faces for the Maltese euro coins. The ‘Baptism
of Christ’ (top right) was eventually sidelined. r Central Bank of Malta.
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But, what else has happened since, or because of, Malta’s accession to the
EU in May 2004? Has the EU served as the appropriate ‘other’ around which
Maltese nationalism can ﬁnd some expression and manifestation?
In my 2002 paper, I had written that one of Malta’s four fears from EU
accession, if not the strongest fear of all, was the fear of invasion. From
entrepreneurs, from students, from workers, from expatriates buying up
property . . . there is a cultural understanding of Malta as being small,
islanded and therefore fragile; of the Maltese culture and language being
unique; and that, if the Maltese were to allow themselves to be taken over,
numerically, by ‘immigrants’ – which wouldn’t take much – then their future
would be at risk (see also Spiteri 2004a). This argument has been presented
(and largely accepted) in the course of EU Accession negotiations, leading to
Malta securing the only permanent derogation given to the ten acceding
countries in 2004: preventing non-residents from the purchase of second
homes on the island (The Economist 2004).
‘Invaders’, by the boatload
But, as is typical of most invasions, the threat has materialised from an
unexpected source.
As if the current demographic strain is not enough,13 Malta ﬁnds itself –
deliberately or, more likely, just serendipitously – as the unwitting victim of a
‘new vulnerability’ (Sammut 2007): the landfall of undocumented migrants
escaping oppression, war, poverty and discrimination and/or heading for the
bright lights of Europe. During 2005, a total of 1,800 immigrants reached
Malta illegally, practically all drifting in by boat. In 2006, another 1,780 illegal
immigrants arrived (see Figure 4). The situation was very soon claimed by the
authorities and the media to have reached crisis proportions: browsing for
news about Malta on the international media or via internet search engines,
the in-migration issue comes up repeatedly.14
The situation is delicate because it has the potential to destabilise the
political atmosphere which has dominated Malta over the last few decades.
Although originating in clearly identiﬁable and distinct social classes, the two
main political parties in Malta have become increasingly shorn of ideological
principles or divides with time. As catch-all parties operating in an open
economy, they have limited room for manoeuvre: they are obliged to woo the
centre ground of politics and promote liberal economic strategies that are
attractive to foreign investment, while respecting Malta’s ambivalent corpo-
rate culture: strongly unionised in the public sector; but strongly familial and
non-unionised in the construction industry and in all small and medium-sized
ﬁrms. The political parties have had even less room for manoeuvre since
January 2008, when the euro was adopted as the national currency; and they
know it.
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Undocumented migrants may threaten this balance. Part of their impact is
predictable, and speaks to Malta’s relative attraction as a ‘developed’
economy. Irrespective of whether the transit to Malta was planned or
haphazard, immigrants who land in Malta would quickly ﬁnd out that the
going rates of pay in the Maltese labour market are much more generous than
anywhere in North Africa or the Middle East. (The industrial minimum wage
in Tunisia, Malta’s closest African [and non-EU] neighbour, is less than
US$200 a month; in Malta, it is about US$200 a week.) Even where wages are
not always determined rigorously and scrupulously in terms of legal principles
– as is common practice in the quarrying and construction industries (for
men) as well as the cleaning and food preparation industries (for women) –
take-home pay is typically very acceptable to newcomers arriving from North
Africa or the Middle East. In turn, these individuals can prove to be attractive
to employers who wish to maintain lax ‘hire and ﬁre’ practices (easily
maintained with the real threat of being reported to the police and eventually
evicted) while paying lower wages and securing high levels of productivity in
jobs that, frankly, many Maltese of working age, able to register for
unemployment beneﬁt, no longer ﬁnd attractive: stone quarrying, construc-
tion, plastering and ship-repair (for men); cleaning and housekeeping (for
women). Regrettably, such clandestine employees often only become visible to
the public eye when they become victims of occupational accidents.
Another likely tangible effect of undocumented migration is to be seen on
the political front. In other countries, notably the Netherlands, Denmark and
Australia, anti-immigrant parties or policies have made strong inroads into
traditional politics, destabilising the consensuality that characterised much of
the post-war period. In Malta, the MLP and the NP are so strongly
entrenched at a local level (all the more so since local councils were
Figure 4. Mediterranean encounters: Malta Armed Forces personnel investigate a
vessel packed with would-be undocumented immigrants. Photo by Darrin Zammit
Lupi for The Times, Malta, 25 September 2005. r Allied Newspapers Limited/
Reuters/Corbis.
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introduced) that they may be justiﬁed in believing that no such wave of
immigrant-driven politics – whether in favour or against – is likely to affect
them and their robust power bases. And yet, their snug non-response has
already been somewhat jolted by an emerging anti-immigrant factionalism.
An explicitly exclusivist, anti-immigrant party, the National Action (Azzjoni
Nazzjonali – AN), contested general elections for the ﬁrst time in Malta in
2008. It joins another right-wing outﬁt, Imperium Europa (Empire Europe) –
whose stated goal is to unite all European natives under one ﬂag – set up in
2000 by Norman Lowell, and who contested the ﬁrst European Parliament
elections held in Malta in June 2004, obtaining 1,603 ﬁrst-count votes from a
total of 250,691 votes cast (0.64 per cent): the best ever showing by an
independent candidate in a nation-wide election since 1966. This neo-Aryan,
anti-immigrant message did not make much headway in the latest general
election;15 but it commands a certain local appeal, and breaks away from the
(superﬁcial?) veneer of Catholic neighbourly charity. While it is avowedly
anti-nationalist – indeed, Lowell has denigrated the Maltese language and all
Malta’s cultural links with North Africa, striving for a European and Latin
ideal that acts as a bulwark against encroaching Islam – it can nevertheless
also stimulate a wave of nationalism that otherwise remains absent in Malta.
Moreover, a dramatic immigrant-related episode at a local level may lead to
some interesting repercussions in a particular electoral district.16 This is
probably something that is waiting to happen.
The political parties themselves would probably be undergoing their own
internal debates as to how to respond to the ‘immigrant threat’. They are
caught between the doves (the champions of human rights, Christian
hospitality and individual freedoms) and the hawks (advocating clampdown,
‘strong-arm’ tactics and policies – such as detention – otherwise meant to
make Malta less attractive to both current and potential undocumented
immigrants). These factions exist within both parties, with the hawks (so far)
in the ascendant within both (Spiteri 2004b).
Meanwhile, the EU presents a welcome ‘front’ to this issue, transforming
the matter into one of regional (and not just national) concern. Malta has
indeed been ﬂexing and testing its newly found status and diplomatic muscle
as a member of the EU with the immigration ﬁle top-most, ensuring that the
EU takes some collective responsibility for the matter. Partisanship has not
always driven this agenda: Malta has ﬁve elected representatives in the
European Parliament (three MLP; two NP), and all ﬁve adopted a common
position calling for amendments to the Dublin II agreement and for the
European Commission to give more assistance to Malta in handling the
immigration ‘menace’.17 These are Malta’s ﬁrst-ever experiences of federalist
politics, and clandestine immigration is the main issue that is driving the
Maltese effort at this time.
The issue already presents an interesting dilemma: on the one hand, Malta
is no longer just an independent sovereign state but is the EU’s southernmost
bulwark. The country has taken on a concern with the security of Europe’s
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borders as part of its new status. Thus, the undocumented migrants reaching
Malta’s shores are also reaching Europe’s shores: they are therefore pre-
sumably a European problem requiring a European solution. Meanwhile,
however, this hoped-for solution is not in sight. A couple of EU member
states have agreed to take a dozen of these migrants as refugees; but this is
hardly going to provide a lasting reprieve from a situation that is not likely to
go away in the near future. Growing frustration on the part of the Maltese at
what can be easily perceived as a crass dismissal by a distant and insensitive
Brussels of a puny Malta can fuel an ‘anti-EU’ nationalism that can feed on
the various fears and suspicions of European incorporation which led to the
strongest negative vote in pre-accession referenda amongst the ten accession
countries in 2003.18
Constructing nationalism
The task of constructing nations and nationalism has been difﬁcult in many Paciﬁc
island states . . .: they came to independence without any struggle against colonialism
. . .(Connell 2007: 85).
John Connell’s caustic observation holds true also for Malta, and is actually a
characteristic of former island colonies that were incorporated into colonial-
ism not for economic exploitation but for strategic purposes, obliging the
engineering of sympathetic colonial subjects by colonial administrations. A
weak national (that is, Cypriot) identity may also help to explain the
intractable ‘Cyprus problem’, with Hellenic or Turkish identities continuing
to exercise a signiﬁcant inﬂuence over explicitly island ones (e.g. Baldacchino
2002b; Mavratsas 2007).
Moreover, since Malta became a republic in 1974, none of its Heads of
State – who should typically serve as individuals that stand aloof from party
politics and facilitate national unity – have ever been directly elected but have
rather been nominated from the ranks of senior governing party politicians,
and never with the support of both sides of the House, thus seriously
damaging their chances of acting as national icons.19 Only one of these
Heads of State, Agatha Barbara, the only woman to have served as President
of the Republic of Malta, had her portrait appear on a Malta bank note. This
choice was so controversial that her facial image only appeared on one bank
note series;20 and no other Maltese Head of State has had this honour.
Indeed, returning to the notion of currency portrayals as indicative of
symbols of national unity, the Central Bank of Malta has printed the face of a
Maltese on a bank note on only one other occasion:21 instead, it has since
opted to reproduce a stylised allegoric image of Malta, a schematic female
ﬁgure that does not have any roots in local history or representation,22 having
appeared mainly as a regular caricature in one local newspaper, and then
adopted in 1989 as the personiﬁcation of the nation on a monument
commemorating twenty-ﬁve years of independence (see Figures 5, 6 and 7).
Placing the image of an actual person on a bank note would most likely
r The author 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009
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alienate half the population, reafﬁrming how the ‘weak state’ (following
Hyden 1983) and its symbols are, or are seen to be, captured by a speciﬁc
political party. And so, in its blandness, allegoric Malta has avoided
controversy. In this and other ways, the state apparatus continues to proffer
constructions of nationhood which are really nothing but symbols of a
nationless polity, coupled with an unwavering, hegemonic, partisan fatigue.
It should not therefore be surprising to ﬁnd limited and safe eruptions of
national pride by a citizenry so far starved of such symbolism, or otherwise
obliged to consume religion as the expression of kitsch, almost banal, cultural
nationalism.23 Recent empirical research by Abela (2006: 23–4) suggests that
‘Maltese national pride, or the emotional dimension of an inherited Maltese
identity, is signiﬁcantly related primarily to people’s attachment to the
[Catholic] Church and religion’, or else, is withdrawn to seek afﬁliation
with a private institution: the family, to the extent that the strong role played
by religion may actually undermine nationalism.
While it lacks corroborative evidence,24 this paper supports the views of
Billig (1995), Cram (2006: 1) and Schmitter (2005) who warn that a proper
understanding of the process of European integration at the grass-roots level
may be driven more by low-proﬁle, ‘day-to-day’ or ‘banal’ events than grand,
constitutional politics. While one should not discount the inﬂuence of EU
membership on the Maltese psyche in the medium to long term, the
‘signiﬁcant other’ so far has not been a difﬁdent Brussels bureaucracy but
the Sudanese migrant who entered Maltese waters seeking safe refuge in
Europe. Mind you, the two referents may yet combine as the complementary
facets of a tragic narrative, if the EU is felt by an increasingly racist-
xenophobic Maltese25 to be avoiding, or even obstructing, an adequate
response to the ‘immigrant threat’. Being part of the EU has encouraged
the evolution of a secular, national character in Malta from a somewhat
unlikely quarter.
When the current President of the Republic of Malta, Edward Fenech
Adami, was appointed (in spite of the MLP’s objections) in 2004, after serving
Figures 5, 6 and 7. Allegorical females: The Malta Independence Monument, Two
Malta Liri Bank Note and Britannia. r Department of Information, Malta; Central
Bank of Malta; Pip Wilson – http://www.wilsonsalmanac.com/book/mar24.html
respectively.
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since 1977 as the leader of the Nationalist Party, he argued that Malta’s
‘system of confrontational politics is positive in the sense that it provides
stability’. In this way, the bimodality of Maltese society – its starkly ‘in or out’
politics (Richards 1982) – is seen as conducive to a political steadiness, with
some of its legitimacy obtained from the altercations of power between two
‘catch-all’ parties. Such a ‘stability’ makes short shrift of serious attempts at
constructing nationalism; although, as this paper has sought to demonstrate,
popular desires for a unifying symbolism – a popular (as against an elite-
driven) nationalism – continue to break surface and render themselves
manifest.
If nationhood is a ﬁction, a necessary imaginary (following Anderson 1983)
in the rhetoric of modern politics, then today’s Maltese appear fully absolved
from this mirage. Most will continue, in their day-to-day lives, to seek a
spoils-based leadership from their preferred politician (for material goods) or
priest (for spiritual ones). But the rupturing of this utilitarian routine by
expressions of national pride or manifestations of what are perceived as
threats to the Maltese partisan polarity may suggest that some sense and
expression of commonality is achievable, even if only at a temporary and
visceral level.
Finally, the presses of the two political parties regularly churn out populist
interpretations of history, which are then sold to the party faithful during
mass party activities. But, in such a polarised society, the local professional
historians and sociologists who read and interpret ‘the signs of the times’ are
themselves liable to being associated with a particular party ticket, even if they
themselves may object to that interpretation. Mitchell (2003) very cleverly (for
a non-Maltese) charts the emergence of a project to historically establish a
Maltese national identity by Maltese academics in the late 1980s. With my
own attempts to critique this project – a criticism which ironically also
contributes to the same project – I am easily associated with a particular
political camp, even though that presumed afﬁliation does not necessarily
reﬂect my past voting patterns or current preferences.
Notes
1 For example, in Slovenia (the ﬁrst 2004 EU accession country to make the euro changeover),
132 tenderers from the general public proposed 699 motifs.
2 The term, coined by Anthony D. Smith, describes a pre-national, ethno-cultural group with
these prerequisites: a collective name, a myth of descent, a shared history, a ‘distinctive shared
culture’, an association with a particular territory, and a sense of solidarity. See Smith (1988).
Both Laburisti and Nazzjonalisti (Labourites and Nationalists in Malta) qualify.
3 Mrkre (1996) develops this argument to explain the relationship between the Faroe Islands
and Denmark.
4 The Maltese Language Act, Chapter 470 of the Laws of Malta, Act 5 of 2004.
5 A powerful residue of these irredentist campaigns is the persisting passionate loyalty and
rivalry of the Maltese for the Italian and English football teams, respectively.
r The author 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009
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6 A situation that may be paralleled by the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, especially when
that island was still a British colony.
7 Jamaica is a more extreme example of a partisan-split island society, where ‘gang wars’
between supporters of the People’s National Party and the Jamaica Labour Party have been
common in the run-up to elections.
8 Apart from Independence Day and Freedom Day, these also include: 7 June (commemorating
aMaltese uprising in 1919); 8 September (commemorating the lifting of the Great Siege in 1565, as
well as the Feast of Our Lady of Victories); and 13 December (commemorating the declaration of
Malta as a Republic in 1974).
9 Hundreds of ecstatic fans welcomed singer Ira Losco at the Malta international airport when
she returned from the Eurovision Contest (which is taken very seriously in Malta). Suggestively,
she had a Maltese Flag around her neck.
10 Ignatieff (2000) deﬁnes patriotism as ‘strong nationalistic feeling for a country whose borders
and whose legitimacy and whose ethnic composition is taken for granted’.
11 Does the Maltese Nation Exist? Bondiplus, 21 January 2003 (Television Malta). http://www.
di-ve.com/dive/portal/portal.jhtml?id=77133&pid=149.
12 The word icons happens to be an anagram for coins.
13 With 400,000 residents perched on 316km2, Malta has one of the world’s highest population
densities for a sovereign state. Some 1.2 million tourist visits annually add to the strain.
14 A list of pertinent media releases can be found at: http://www.maltamedia.com/features/io/
2005/08/index.shtml.
15 In the general elections held on 8 March 2008, Imperium Europa, represented only by Norman
Lowell, obtained eighty-four ‘ﬁrst count’ votes; National Action obtained 1,461. These amount to
0.53 per cent of the total votes cast.
16 The Maltese Islands are divided into thirteen electoral districts, from each of which ﬁve
candidates are elected, on the basis of a ‘single transferable vote’, proportional representation
system.
17 Dublin II obliges receiver countries to deal with asylum seekers. It is deemed to penalise Malta
as a small, front-line state. Through the European Parliament, the MEPs tabled a motion (5 April
2006) demanding, among other things, a mechanism allowing a quota of those landing in Malta to
be taken in by other EU nations. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=
MOTION&reference=P6-RC-2006-0241&language=EN.
18 With a ninety per cent turnout – low, by local standards – 53.5 per cent of voters approved
Malta’s accession to the EU in a March 2003 referendum.
19 Only an acting President of the Republic, Paul Xuereb (1987–1989), received cross-party
support for his nomination.
20 This was the fourth series issued by the Central Bank of Malta in 1986. Currency is showcased
at: http://www.centralbankofmalta.com/site/currency2d.html.
21 This was the portrayal of Prime Minister and Nationalist Party Leader Gorg Borg Olivier,
who secured independence for Malta in 1964.
22 Unlike, say, Britannia, to which however ‘Malta’ does have an uncanny resemblance (see
Figure 7).
23 For example, it is almost impossible to speak secular Maltese without regular references to
God (Alla).
24 I agree with my colleague Peter Mayo (personal communication, 25 March 2008) that ‘the
subject needs to be explored at a deeper level with some interviews to provide some sense of how
people make sense of their world, their sense of the context in which they live, and what type of
‘imagined community’, if any, they dream up’.
25 A poll in August 2005 found that more than ninety per cent of respondents had no objection to
having a European neighbour, but an equal number said that having an Arab or African
neighbour was ‘highly undesirable’. Moreover, more than seventy-ﬁve per cent of respondents
claimed that they would not give shelter to persons who were trying to escape their native land
because of political persecution, war, civil war, hunger or mass poverty. See Vassallo (2005).
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